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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SENATE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS: IS A
HANDS OFF APPROACH APPROPRIATE?
I. INTRODUCrION
The Supreme Court has decided numerous cases in its history
that establish doctrines and principles to be applied in determining
whether a particular case may be reviewed by the federal courts.
While the Constitution provides that the federal courts may hear
any "case or controversy" that arises under federal law, ' Supreme
Court jurisprudence has significantly narrowed the class of cases
that actually qualify as such a "case or controversy."2 Among
these judicially created 'justiciability ,doctrines" is the political
question doctrine3 under which the Court deems certain issues to
be beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate.
Much controversy has surrounded the Supreme Court's use
and analysis of the political question doctrine as a means to pre-
vent federal court review of particular cases The decision of the
Supreme Court in Walter Nixon v. United States, is the latest ap-
plication of this doctrine, again raising questions of the appropriate
application of the doctrine in limiting the power of the federal
courts.
Walter L. Nixon Jr. was the former Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.6 Nix-
on was sentenced to prison after being convicted in 1987 of two
counts of making false statements before a federal grand jury.7
1. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
2. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 50-86 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
5. 113 S. CL 732 (1993).
6. Id. at 734.
7. Id.
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The grand jury investigation arose from allegations that Nixon had
accepted bribes from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for
which Nixon asked a local district attorney to cease an investiga-
tion of the businessman's son.8
Following his conviction, the House of Representatives on
May 10, 1989, adopted three Articles of Impeachment for High
Crimes and Misdemeanors. The first two Articles charged Nixon
with falsely testifying before the grand jury and the third charged
him with b nging disrepute to the Federal Judiciary.9 The House
then preser ed the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate, after
which the Senate voted to invoke Impeachment Rule XI," provid-
ing that the presiding officer could appoint a committee of Sena-
tors to "receive evidence and take testimony.""
The Senate committee proceeded to conduct four days of
hearings at which ten witnesses, including Nixon, testified. 2 As
8. Id. Surprisingly, while in prison, Nixon actually continued to receive his judicial
salary because he refused to resign from his office. Id
9. Id.
10. S. IMP. R. XI, reprinted in SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. NO. 1, 10ST CONG., IST
SEss. 186 (1989). Senate Rule XI provides:
In the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if
the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence
and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine,
and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to
be elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate)
exercise all of the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the
Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and
practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and prac-
tice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the proce-
dure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed
shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the
proceedings and testimony had and given before such committee, and such
report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the
testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to
the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as
having been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall
prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in
open Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
11. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting SENATE MANUAL at 186).
12. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 164, 101ST CONG., IST Sass. 4 (1989)). Specifically, the
House managers called a total of four witnesses. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9,
10 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). An
additional six witnesses, including Nixon, testified for the defense. Id. The hearing was
also broadcast live to all Senators' offices and videotaped "for future reference." Id. How-
ever, it is unknown how many Senators actually took advantage of these opportunities to
view the proceedings conducted by the committee. Id.
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required by Rule XI, the committee thereafter presented the full
Senate with a complete record of the evidence as well as a report
summarizing both the contested and uncontested facts.13 In addi-
tion, Nixon and the House impeachment managers presented final
briefs to the full Senate, made oral arguments including a personal
appeal by Nixon himself, and the parties were questioned by Sena-
tors.14 Following these proceedings, the Senate voted, by more
than the Constitutionally required two-thirds majority, to convict
Nixon on two of the three Articles." Judgment was therefore en-
tered by the presiding officer, removing Nixon from his office as a
United States district judge.16
Following his removal, Nixon sued in district court, arguing
that the Senate's proceedings pursuant to Rule X violated its con-
stitutional duty to "try" all impeachments because he was not af-
forded a hearing before the full Senate. 7 Nixon sought a declara-
During the course of the committee proceedings, Nixon also made a motion for a
trial before the full Senate based upon that portion of Rule XI which provides that:
"[Nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his
testimony in open Senate . The motion was denied by the committee on July 25.
1989. Id. at 11.
13. ld. The Senate committee did not vote on Nixon's guilt or innocence, nor did it
make any recommendation to the full Senate. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 10. The importance
of credibility determinations in the impeachment trial is evident from the committee's re-
port. The report, filed on October 16, 1989, provided in part:
Many specific details - including some that are very important -
about each of these conversations are disputed by the parties. Indeed, the com-
mittee received dramatically inconsistent testimony concerning the substance,
date, and result of these conversations from the participants in the conversations
themselves - Judge Nixon, Wiley Fairchild, and Bud Holmes - as well as
from a fourth witness .... Familiarity with these witnesses' various, and
divergent, testimony concerning these three conversations is critical to obtaining
an understanding of the parties' respective positions ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citing REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMrrrE ON THE
ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE WALTER L. NIXON, JR., S. DOC. No. 164, 101ST CONG., 1ST
Snss., at 18-19 (1989)).
14. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735. In his brief, Nixon renewed his motion requesting a trial
before the full Senate. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 11. His brief also emphasized the impor-
tance of credibility issues to his case. Il Furthermore, it was asserted that the
committee's omission of several passages of Nixon's own testimony from its Report to
the Senate was both misleading and inaccurate. Id. These objections notwithstanding, no
witnesses were called to testify before the full Senate. Ia
15. Nixon, 113 S. Ct at 735. Article I, § 3 of the Constitution provides that "no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present."
Prior to voting on the merits of Nixon's impeachment, the Senate voted 90 to 7 to deny
Nixon's motion for a trial before the full Senate. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 11.
16. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S14,493, 14,636 (1989)).
17. Ld. The Constitution vests the Senate with "the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Nixon alleged that this language requires the full
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tory judgment that his conviction by the Senate was void and that
he was entitled to reinstatement of his judicial salary and privileg-
es."8 The district court held that his claim was non-justiciable, 9
and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2'
The district court reasoned that the Senate's denial of Nixon's
motion to be tried by the full Senate was not the type of constitu-
tional violation that the Supreme Court has recognized as justicia-
ble.2 However, the court went on to state that Nixon might have
been able to prevail and obtain the relief sought were he "convict-
ed without any semblance of a trial."'  But, upon a review of the
procedures afforded Nixon, the district court concluded that they
did not "resul[t] in the dimension of departure from the
Constitution's textual commitment to the Senate of the 'sole Power
to try all Impeachments' as to make this controversy justiciable
and the claim meritorious." 3
Senate to "try" an impeachment on the Senate floor so that all Senators present may view
witnesses, hear their testimony, and effectively judge their credibility. 744 F. Supp at 10.
Since only "the Senate' is granted authority to "try" impeachments, Nixon claims that his
conviction and Senate Rule XI violate the literal requirements of Article L Id.
18. Nixon, 113 S. CL at 735.
19. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 9.
20. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aJFd, 113 S. Ct. 732
(1993).
21. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 14. The District Court relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1962), discussed infra at notes 73-77 and
accompanying text, where the House had attempted to establish qualifications for its mem-
bers beyond those specified in the Constitution. The explicit language in the Constitution
setting forth the qualifications for House members precluded the House from expanding its
membership requirements. I& at 520.
The Senate's refusal to grant Nixon a trial before the full Senate was distinguished
from the House's actions in Powell based on the absence of any requirement in the Con-
stitution that the full Senate try all impeachments. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 14. The
Senate's decision was deemed to more closely resemble "a procedural ruling pursuant to
the Senate's rule making authority created by Article I, § 5, cl. 2, as to the type of trial
to be accorded this particular plaintiff.. "i.
22. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 14.
23. Id. The District Court has confused the issues with this final statement. The court
first determines that because of the commitment of the sole power to try impeachments to
the Senate, that the Senate has full, unreviewable authority to determine the procedures it
engages. Id. This determination leads to Nixon's claim being deemed non-justiciable -
the court cannot review the merits because it is without the Constitutional power to do
so. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court goes on to re-
view on the merits the type of proceeding conducted by the Senate in hearing Nixon's
case, stating that the proceedings were not so inadequate as to violate the Senate's duty
to "try" impeachments. Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 14. Thus, according to the court's state-
ment, had Nixon's conviction been without "any semblance of a trial," his claim would
have been justiciable and "meritorious." lit
NIXON V. UNITED STATES
Two judges of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Nixon's claim was non-justiciable pursuant to
the political question doctrine and independent analysis of the
Constitution's impeachment provisions.2 However, Judge Harry T.
Edwards, while concurring in the judgment, dissented on the issue
of justiciability, stating that the matter was justiciable in the federal
courts.' Judge Edwards nevertheless concluded that on the merits,
Nixon received a fair trial by the Senate committee and was not
deprived of his constitutional rights.'s
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court,
holding Nixon's claims to be non-justiciable pursuant to the politi-
cal question doctrineY The Court concluded that the word "try"
in the Constitution "lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicial-
ly manageable standard of review.' '" The Court stated that this
lack of standards bolstered its conclusion that the issue has been
textually committed solely to the Senate, therefore bringing im-
peachment procedures within the ambit of the political question
doctrine.29 Justice White, while concurring in the judgment, took
the approach of Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit. Justice White
found no prohibition forbidding the Court from reviewing the mer-
its of Nixon's case, but concluded that the trial Nixon received was
constitutional on the merits.3°
Where the district court errs is in its conclusion that the Senate's decision to utilize
the hearing committee was a decision committed solely to the Senate and therefore unre-
viewable by the federal courts so long as the procedures afforded the individual being
tried are adequate. By considering to any extent the actual hearing's procedures and
protections, the court is reaching the merits of Nixon's claims. However, if the Senate's
exercise of power here is non-justiciable, the court can never reach the merits because it
lacks jurisdiction on the issue. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
24. Nixon, 938 F.2d at 246. Judge Stephen F. Williams concluded that impeachment
claims of a federal judge could never be judicially reviewed because the result would be
that the judiciary would have final, unreviewable control over the one procedure designed
to restrain the judiciary, resulting in a "checkmate" situation. Id. Judge Randolph con-
curred in the judgment, but based his conclusion that Nixon's claim was non-justiciable
on his own independent review of the Constitutional impeachment provisions. Id. at 247.
He found that the determination of the impeachment issue had been committed to another
branch of the federal government, not the courts. Id. While recognizing that his conclu-
sion may fall within the realm of the political question doctrine, Judge Randolph found
"no need to rely on [that] somewhat 'amorphous' doctrine .... " Id at 248.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 740 (1993).
28. Id. at 736.
29. Id.
30. Ia at 740-41.
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This comment argues that, contrary to the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court, Justice White's approach is correct and the
Court should have held Nixon's claims to be justiciable and
reached the merits of his claims. The majority's reasoning is curso-
ry and unpersuasive, leading the reader to question whether the
Court was finding the matter non-justiciable in blatant avoidance of
the difficult task of reviewing the Senate's procedures and the fear
of causing a political upheaval. The Court's conclusion that it
cannot ascertain the meaning of "try" in order to review the
Senate's procedures does not comport with its past constitutional
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Court refuses to distinguish between
the substantive judgment either to convict or acquit on Articles of
Impeachment and the procedural aspects by which such a determi-
nation is made. By blurring this distinction, the Court reaches the
result it desires by emphasizing the separation of powers concerns
and the importance of impeachment proceedings as a check on the
judiciary. Because the judiciary should arguably play absolutely no
part in the substantive determination, the Court bootstraps the pro-
cedural component to its ultimate judgment that impeachments are
in no way subject to judicial review.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Justiciability Doctrines
The federal judicial power is defined in Article Ill, Section 2
of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Article III provides
that the federal courts are vested with the power to hear nine cate-
gories of "cases" or "controversies."31 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this case or controversy requirement as imposing sub-
stantial constitutional limits on the federal judicial power.32 Where
no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III is found
to exist, the federal courts are without power to adjudicate the
controversy.
31. Those nine categories are: (1) cases arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made under their Authority; (2) cases affecting ambassadors,
public ministers or consuls; (3) cases of admiralty and maritime law; (4) controversies to
which the United States is a party; (5) controversies between two or more States or (6)
between a State and citizens of another state; (7) controversies between citizens of differ-
ent states; (8) controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants
of different states; and (9) controversies between a state or citizens thereof and a foreign
state, citizens or subjects. U.S. CoNST., art. MI.
32. ERwiN CHEMERINSkY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, § 2.1, at 38 (1989).
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In addition to the constitutional restrictions limiting the juris-
diction of the federal courts, the Supreme Court has imposed sever-
al additional limitations on the federal judicial power that are de-
rived neither from the text of the Constitution nor the intent of the
Framers in drafting the document. Rather, the Court has developed
these additional limitations as a result of their interpretations of
Article I and the construction of principles necessary for "prudent
judicial administration."'33 This latter category of limitations,
termed "prudential," precludes federal judicial review in the inter-
ests of policy considerations even though the Constitution imposes
no such limitations.
Together these constitutional and prudential limitations com-
prise the justiciability doctrines which operate to determine those
matters federal courts may hear and decide, and those which must
be dismissed.' Supreme Court decisions are the source of both
the constitutional and prudential limits on justiciability."5 These
doctrines include the "prohibition against advisory opinions, stand-
ing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine." '36 The
Supreme Court determines whether a particular restriction on feder-
al judicial power derives from constitutional or prudential princi-
ples. 7 Certain doctrines, such as standing, have been explained by
the Court as deriving from both constitutional and prudential prin-
ciples, while others, such as the political question doctrine, have
yet to be identified as falling within either category of limita-
tion.38
The policy considerations underlying the justiciability doctrines
are often identical, making clear distinctions between the constitu-
tional and prudential aspects of the limitations difficult.39 Several
principles in fact underlie all justiciability doctrines. For example,
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. The prohibition against advisory opinions ensures that a federal court's decision
will have an effect on the parties to the litigation in a case where an actual dispute ex-
ists between the parties. Id § 2.2, at 43. Standing involves the determination of whether
a complaining party is the proper individual to bring the matter before the federal forum
- it answers the question of who may litigate. Ma. § 2.1, at 41. Ripeness and mootness
answer the question of when a matter may be litigated, with ripeness preventing prema-
ture litigation and mootness preventing adjudication of disputes that have been resolved.
Id. § 2.1, at 42.
37. Id § 2.1, at 39.
38. Id
39. Id
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separation of powers concerns are an important factor underlying
the development of the justiciability doctrines, limiting the
judiciary's power to review the acts of the President and Con-
gress.' The conservation of judicial resources is also promoted by
the justiciability doctrines, ensuring that the courts spend their time
focusing on those matters most deserving of judicial review. 1
In addition, the doctrines operate to preclude from review
cases that do not present concrete controversies. This requirement
is premised on the belief that parties with a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation will be best suited to fully present the
court with all relevant information necessary to properly decide the
case.42 Thus, concrete controversies with adverse parties are best
suited for judicial review.
Fairness - to litigants as well as individuals not party to the
controversy - is another important policy underlying the justicia-
bility doctrines. The federal courts are prevented by the doctrines
from hearing cases in which litigants are attempting to adjudicate
the rights of persons who are not parties to the lawsuit.43 By pre-
venting such situations from arising, the interests of third parties
who may be satisfied with the present state of affairs are protected
from having their situation altered. Furthermore, because court
decisions almost always affect many individuals even where an
individual seeks to litigate on his or her own behalf, fairness is
best promoted by limiting judicial review to situations where it is
indeed necessary.'
The need for these limitations, however, must be balanced
against the importance of federal judicial review.4' While the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly addressed the policy considerations
supporting the limitation of federal judicial power,' it is equally
important that the federal forum be available for the adjudication
of constitutional violations and for the prevention and remedy of
federal law violations.47 Accordingly, the justiciability doctrines
must be applied so as not to prevent the federal courts from fulfill-
ing their crucial constitutional role.
40. Md
41. It.
42. Id. § 2.1, at 40.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
1506 [Vol. 43:1499
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The appropriate balance to be struck between judicial review
and judicial restraint, however, is not easily ascertained. The dis-
pute surrounding this issue has been ongoing, and turns in essence
upon the appropriate role of the federal courts. 48 The controversy
extends to the Supreme Court's treatment of the justiciability doc-
trines. The dispute is centralized over the extent to which the Court
has expanded the doctrines to preclude judicial review. A related
issue is the nature of Court's decisions - should the Court be
firm and predictable or flexible and malleable in construing the
doctrines? 9 Regardless of how these issues are ultimately settled
(if ever), it is clear that the justiciability doctrines are a cornerstone
of federal jurisdiction.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine "postulates that there exist
certain issues of constitutional law that are more effectively re-
solved by the political branches of government and are therefore
inappropriate for judicial resolution.""0 In applying this doctrine,
the Supreme Court has held that it will not decide certain challeng-
es to government actions alleged to be unconstitutional although all
jurisdictional and the other justiciability requirements are met."'
Instead, the Court leaves the constitutionality determination to the
politically accountable branches - Congress and the President. 2
The doctrine thus constrains the subject matter that is appropriate
for federal court review.
The doctrine has been described as "the most confusing of the
justiciability doctrines"' and as an "enigma" 4.T Moreover, the
doctrine itself has been called a misnomer because federal courts in
reality deal with political issues on a regular basis.5 Much of the
48. Id.
49. Id. § 2.1, at 41.
50. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U. L.
RLv. 1031, 1031 (1985) (footnote omitted).
51. CHEMEwNsKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 124.
52. Id.
53. IA
54. Redish, supra note 50, at 1031.
55. CHENmRINSKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 125. Examples of such involvement in
political issues by the Supreme Court include United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), where President Nixon was ordered to comply with a subpoena to produce audio
tapes of presidential conversations needed as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Also, in
Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Court declared unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination that existed in the Texas Democratic political primary. Id.
15071993]
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difficulty and confusion that surrounds the doctrine is a result of
the Supreme Court's political doctrine jurisprudence: The Court has
defined the doctrine very differently over the course of many
years.
5 6
The Supreme Court first articulated the political question doc-
trine in Marbury v. Madison.57 Marbury dealt with the nature of
Presidential decisionmaking, distinguishing certain executive deci-
sions as being solely within the President's discretion. By virtue of
the President's having been vested with "certain important political
powers," he can be held accountable for his discretionary decisions
only through the political process. 58 Chief Justice Marshall thus
described the political question as "[q]uestions, in their nature po-
litical, or which are by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court." 9 Cases where indi-
vidual rights were at stake were distinguished from political ques-
tions and the Court stated that such cases could never be political
questions.6'
The political question definition set forth in Marbury was
quite narrow, for it would require the Court to decide all cases that
came before it unless its interpretation of the Constitution leads it
to find that the determination of the issue has been committed to
another branch of the government for decision.6' This early con-
struction of the doctrine would therefore require review of a claim
that an individual right has been infringed. However, more recent
Court decisions have expanded the realm of the political question
doctrine such that today there are instances where individuals alleg-
ing specific constitutional violations and concrete injury are pre-
cluded from judicial review of their claims.62
The Supreme Court set forth its most detailed analysis of the
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr.63 In that case, the
Court ultimately held that the doctrine should not be applied. Yet,
56. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 125.
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. Id. at 165.
59. Id. at 170.
60. Id
61. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-13, at 96 (2d ed.
1988).
62. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding issue involving
constitutionality of government search of home for evidence of participation in a prohibit-
ed election to be nonjusticiable).
63. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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in formulating its statement of the political question doctrine, the
Court failed to articulate useful criteria to determine when the sub-
ject matter presented involves a non-justiciable political question.'"
Specifically, the Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.'
These criteria appear useless when closely examined.6 For exam-
ple, the Constitution does not provide for judicial review, let alone
place limits upon it through "textually demonstrable commitment"
of issues to other branches.67 Moreover, the text of the Constitu-
tion is written in "broad, open-textured language6 ' such that it is
impossible to discern "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards"'69 from the document itself. Indeed, one commentator has
described the doctrine as being "impossible for a court or a com-
mentator to apply ... to identify what cases are political ques-
tions."7
The Supreme Court has invoked the political question doctrine
in several political contexts, including challenges to uphold the
requirement of a republican form of government7f ' and actions to
review the electoral process.' The doctrine has also been invoked
64. CHmmENsk'Y, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 126.
65. Baker, 396 U.S. at 217.
66. CHEmISKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 126.
67. IM.
68. Id § 2.6, at 127.
69. Baker, 396 U.S. at 217.
70. Ci-I ESKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 127.
71. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), the court held that a challenge to
the Rhode Island government as violating the republican form of government clause, arti-
cle IV, section 4, of the Constitution, presented a political question unreviewable in feder-
al court.
72. See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-554 (1946) (holding challenge to con-
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to declare issues related to foreign affairs to be outside the realm
of justiciable questions. 3
Conversely, the Court refused to apply the political question
doctrine in Powell v. McCormack,74 a case involving review of
the internal decisions of Congress. In Powell the House of Repre-
sentatives had refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell despite the
fact that he had been elected to the position.75 The House attempt-
ed to exclude Powell based on the findings of its Committee that
Powell had presented falsified expense accounts.76 The Court
looked to Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which states that
Congress may under certain circumstances expel a member, and
distinguished the House's actions as excluding rather than expel-
ling.7 The Court further concluded that no political question was
posed because it found Article I, Section 5 to be "at most a 'textu-
ally demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge only the
qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution" namely, age,
citizenship, and residence. Because the House considered a factor
outside the constitutionally provided criteria, and the criteria were
specifically enumerated, the Court was able to discern that the
House's conduct was unconstitutional.
Until very recently, the Supreme Court had not decided wheth-
er the impeachment provisions of Article II, Section 4 of the Con-
stitution present a political question.79 The Constitution provides
that the House has the sole power of impeachment, while the Sen-
ate has the sole power to try all impeachments."0 Thus, two issues
could arise in the impeachment context for judicial review: (1)
whether the offenses leading to impeachment were sufficient as a
gressional districting in Illinois nonjusticiable); but see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (holding equal protection challenge to Tennessee malapportionment due to racial
discrimination justiciable); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (challenge to
political gerrymandering by Illinois republican representatives held justiciable under equal
protection clause).
73. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (declaring foreign
relations to be committed to legislative and executive branches).
74. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
75. kla at 489.
76. Il at 490.
77. Article I, § 5 of the Constitution provides that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . U.S. CONST. art I §
5.
78. Powell, 395 U.S. at 549.
79. CHnMERiNsKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 144.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2 and § 3.
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matter of substantive constitutional law to support an impeachment
decision; and (2) whether the individual's procedural due process
rights were adequately protected by the impeachment procedures."1
The former category of challenge - substantive requirements -
arguably should never be subject to judicial review." Judicial re-
straint is particularly appropriate because impeachment is an ex-
traordinary remedy.'
However, total judicial abdication should not be the approach
taken by the courts with respect to impeachment. Rather, courts
should proceed with deference to congressional determinations and
caution in any such proceeding, but review should nevertheless
take place in order to "uphold the Constitution and protect the
separation of federal powers."" This judicial review is imperative
when constitutional procedural requirements are allegedly trans-
gressed.
A distinction could be drawn between the procedural require-
ments of the impeachment process and the substantive judgment of
impeachment that certain conduct constitutes a high crime or mis-
demeanor warranting removal from office." The substantive deter-
mination could be left to the sole and exclusive judgment of Con-
gress. The Courts would then be free to interpret and enforce the
procedural requirements mandated by the Constitution. The Su-
preme Court has not made this distinction in construing the politi-
cal question doctrine. Whether the Court should, however, 'depends
upon what the appropriate role of the federal judiciary is in our
system of government. 6
81. CHEMEN SKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 144.
82. See CHARLES L. BLAcK, JR., IMPEAcHMENT A HANDBOOK 53-54 (1974) (de-
scribing "absurdity" of position that could occur in which a President, having been im-
peached by the House and tried, convicted and removed by the Senate, after appealing to
the Supreme Court could be reinstated for the remainder of his term based on the Court's
disagreement with the House's and Senate's judgments). See also CHBEm sKY, supra
note 32, § 2.6, at 145 ("[a] constitutional crisis of unprecedented magnitude would arise
if Congress impeached and convicted a president, but the federal courts invalidated that
decision.").
83. CHedaiUNSKY, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 145.
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. See generally id.
86. Id.
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II. WALTER NIXON V. UNiTED STATES
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, begins with a de novo review of the justiciability of
Nixon's claims. The Court explains that "a controversy is
nonjusticiable - i.e., involves a political question - where there
is a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . ."", The
first inquiry requires interpretation of the text in question to deter-
mine the extent of textual commitment.8 However, in making this
determination, the Court explained that lack of judicially manage-
able standards may bolster the conclusion that an issue has been
textually committed to a coordinate branch of governmentY
The justiciability of Nixon's claim rests upon the Court's inter-
pretation of Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution,
which confers upon the Senate the authority to preside over im-
peachment actions.' That Article provides:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath
or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
The Court found the word "sole" in the first sentence to indicate
that authority is exclusively reposed in the Senate and nowhere
else.9 The remainder of the clause specifies requirements to
which the Senate proceedings must conform.'
The Court next turned to an examination of the word "try" and
the intent of the Framers in using that term.93 Nixon argued that
to "try" required more than merely to vote, review or judge.'
87. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id.
91. /,
92. Il at 736.
93. Id.
94. L
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Rather, he contended that both at the time the Constitution was
written and today, to try means to hear the evidence, not to scan a
cold record.95 Therefore, argued Nixon, the courts may review the
proceedings afforded him by the Senate as to whether or not he
was "tried" before being convicted.'
The Court rejected Nixon's position, finding "several difficul-
ties" with it.' It stated that Nixon's construction of the term was
too narrow by both today's definitions and those of 1-787."8 Be-
cause of the "variety of definitions," the Court concluded that the
Framers did not intend the term "try" to constitute an implied
limitation on the Senate's method of trying impeachments."
Therefore, concluded the Court, the word "try" lacked sufficient
precision to afford a judicially manageable standard for judicial
review of the Senate's procedures."m This conclusion was bol-
stered by what the Court viewed as three "very specific require-
ments" that are imposed on the Senate in trying impeachments: (1)
members must be under oath or affirmation; (2) a two-thirds vote
is required to convict; and (3) when the President is tried, the
Chief Justice presides.' The precise nature of these requirements,
stated the Court, led to its conclusion that "try" was not intended
to impose additional limits on the Senate's choice of proceed-
ings. 
°0
The Court next considered the significance of the word "sole"
in the first sentence of Clause 6. The common sense meaning of
that word, according to the Court, is that the Senate shall have
exclusive authority to determine whether acquittal or conviction is
appropriate in impeachment cases.0 3 To allow judicial review of
the Senate's actions as to whether an individual had been "tried"
would prevent the Senate from operating independently and without
outside interference."°4
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court specifically looked to dictionaries from 1785 defining "try" as "to
examine" or "to examine as a judge" and compared those definitions with more modem
definitions, circa 1971, defining "try" as "to examine or investigate judicially," "to con-
duct the trial of," or "to put to the test by experiment, investigation, or trial." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
99. Id.
100. 1&.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Nixon made several arguments with respect to the word "sole" in the first
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The Court went on to state that "history and contemporary
understanding of the impeachment provisions" support its interpre-
tation of the Clause's language. °5 Specifically, the Court found it
significant that neither party offered any evidence from the Consti-
tutional Convention or contemporary commentators alluding to the
possibility of judicial review of the impeachment process. 6 This
silence in light of other specific references to judicial review of the
Legislature's conduct"6 was "quite meaningful" to the Court.'06
Furthermore, the Court discussed the Framer's conclusion to
rest the authority to try impeachments with the Senate rather than
the judiciary."6 The Framers chose the Senate over the Supreme
Court because of its representative capacity and the difficulties of
enforcement that could arise if the justices' determination conflicted
with the accusations brought."0 Moreover, the Court noted that
the Supreme Court was deemed to be too small in number by the
Framers to entrust to it the "awful discretion" which an impeach-
ment proceeding necessarily involves."'
The Court continued, noting two additional reasons why the
sentence of Clause 6. First, he argued that the word has no substantive meaning and was
a cosmetic edit by the Committee of Style after ratification of the substance of the clause.
Ia at 737. The Court rejected this argument because the Committee only revised the
language, perfecting what the Framers had agreed to. Id. Also, the Court concluded that
Nixon's argument would mean that the second-to-last draft would always govern where
the Committee of Style added language. Since the Convention passed the Committee's
final version, however, Nixon's argument was refuted. Id.
Second, Nixon argued that "sole" did not bear on justiciability in light of the pro-
hibition on the President's pardoning power in impeachment cases. ME. Such a limit would
not have been necessary if the Senate had exclusive authority to deal with such questions,
according to Nixon. d. The Court distinguished a pardon as mitigating punishment for a
crime, not an overturning of a conviction. Id. Therefore, the exclusion of the pardoning
power from impeachment proceedings was not inconsistent with the Senate's authority to
determine its impeachment procedures. Id.
Nixon's third argument was that "the Senate" meant only the full Senate, not a
committee (nor obviously the courts or a jury), could try impeachments. l. The Court
found the argument to be an unnatural reading and stated that such a construction would
bring within judicial purview numerous claims that "the Senate" imposed limitations on
procedures the Senate may adopt. Id Nixon's construction would also be inconsistent with
the Court's construction of Clause 6 as a whole. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The Court pointed out the specific references to judicial review as a check on the
legislature with respect to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and statutes. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 738.
110. Id
111. Id
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judiciary was deemed to be the inappropriate tribunal to have a
role in impeachments."2 First, impeachments were likely to in-
volve two sets of proceedings - a criminal trial and an impeach-
ment trial."' These forums were specifically separated to "avoid
raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judg-
ments..' . 4 Second, judicial review of impeachments would be in-
consistent with the Framers' insistence on a system of checks and
balances because impeachments are designed as a check on the
judiciary."5 The Court viewed Nixon's argument as placing final
reviewing authority of impeachment decisions in the hands of the
body meant to be regulated by the process of impeachment." 6
Additionally, Nixon made the argument that judicial review of
the impeachment process is necessary as a check on the legisla-
ture."7 He argued that allowing the legislature to interpret the-
Impeachment Clause free from review would be a usurpation of the
judicial power."' The Court rebutted Nixon's argument by point-
ing to two constitutional safeguards it claimed were established by
the Framers in anticipation of this same objection. The first safe-
guard is the division of the impeachment power between two legis-
lative bodies - the House to accuse and the Senate to try.19 The
second safeguard is the supermajority requirement of a two-thirds
vote.2t
Concluding its textual commitment analysis, the Court indicated
additional reasons for its conclusion that Nixon's claim should be
non-justiciable. Specifically, the "lack of finality and difficulty of
fashioning relief' were cited as supporting the Court's conclu-
sion.'2' The Court expressly adopted the circuit court's argument
that to open the door to judicial review of the Senate's impeach-
ment procedures would lead to chaos in the country's political
112. Id.
113. Id. The Constitution explicitly provides for such separate proceedings in Article I,
§ 3. Clause 7. 1&.
114. L (citation omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 739.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Court quoted Hamilton's explanation that "'as the concurrence of two-thirds
of the senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this
additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire."' Id. (quoting T1m FED-
ERALLT No. 65, at 442 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
121. Id
151519931
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
life." This effect, especially true were the President to be
impeached," coupled with the question of what relief if any a
court may provide other than setting aside a conviction, led to the
conclusion that Nixon's claim should be non-justiciable.
Nixon's final argument was likewise rejected by the Court.
This argument was based on the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in Powell v. McCormack.'24 Powell turned upon the Court's de-
termination of whether and to what extent the Constitution commit-
ted authority to the House of Representatives to judge its members'
qualifications."z Because the Constitution specifically enumerated
three requirements for membership in the House, the Court deter-
mined that the qualifications the House could require were precise
and limited."as Thus, Powell's claim was justiciable because to
allow the House to determine its members' qualifications unre-
viewed would allow defeat of the express enumeration of qualifica-
tions. 27 To the contrary, however, allowing the Senate to inter-
pret the meaning of "try" would not defeat the purpose of any
other constitutional provision.s Thus, the Court concluded that
"the word 'try' does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the
authority which is committed to the Senate."'29
122. Id.
123. The Court explained:
This lack of finality would manifest itself most dramatically if the President
were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness,
would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process was running
its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted senate might
conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated.
Ia
124. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case).
125. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739.
126. Id.
127. L at 740.
128. Id
129. Id.
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B. The Concurring Opinions"3
Justice White's concurrence, in which Justice Blackmun joined,
was the only opinion which was based upon a finding that Nixon's
claims were justiciable."' Justice White began his, opinion with a
recognition of the unlikely event that the Senate would adopt a
procedure that could not be deemed to constitute a trial by reason-
able judges." Nevertheless, he concluded that it would be unwise
to vest in Congress unreviewable discretion, thereby inviting the
Senate to "find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business,
to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment pro-
cess."
133
130. Justices Stevens, White and Souter each filed separate concurring opinions. The
opinions of Justices Stevens and Souter will not be examined at length, but are mentioned
here for completeness.
Justice Stevens, in a brief concurrence, emphasized the importance of respect to a
coordinate branch of government. He noted that nothing in the history of the Senate's
exercise of its impeachment powers suggests that the Senate is not well aware of the
profound importance of its task. Id. at 740. Further, he explained that the hypotheticals
mentioned by Justices White and Souter (envisioning acts by the Senate that seriously
threaten the integrity of a conviction such as a coin-toss or summary determination) were
improbable where proper respect was afforded the Senate. Id
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that Nixon's claims presented a nonjusticiable
political question. Id at 747. He concluded that the Impeachment Trial Clause "contem-
plates that the Senate may determine, within broad boundaries, such subsidiary issues as
the procedures for receipt and consideration of evidence necessary to satisfy its duty to
'try' impeachments." Id. at 748. In addition, Justice Souter found two other considerations
that confirm his conclusion that the case is non-justiciable. The first is adherence to a
political decision that has already been made, and the second is the potential embarrass-
ment that could ensue from "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." Id (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). He also noted that judi-
cial review of impeachment decisions would disrupt the functioning of the government. Id.
Justice Souter also, as mentioned above, discussed situations where judicial interference
may be appropriate - as where the Senate's actions go well beyond the scope of its
authority. Id
131. Justice White stated: "The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us
even to consider [Nixon's] contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore
reach the merits of the claim." IA at 740. While Justice White ultimately concluded that
on the merits, Nixon received a constitutional "trial" by the Senate's procedures, this
analysis will not be reviewed as a discussion of the merits is beyond the scope of this
comment.
132. L at 741.
133. L Justice White noted that at oral arguments, the Solicitor General had been
asked whether under the Government's theory (that the Senate has sole authority to decide
procedures) the constitutional direction that the Senate "try" impeachments would be satis-
fied if the Senate, without affording any procedures, found the accused guilty of being a
"bad guy" and thus convicted without further proceedings. The Government's counsel
answered "yes" - indicating to Justice White the necessity of not vesting the Senate with
absolute authority in this context L
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Justice White next examined the majority's determination that a
textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to another political
branch exists and that the question can nonetheless not be deter-
mined for lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards." First, he rejected the majority's construction of the ques-
tion of textual commitment as whether exclusive responsibility for
a particular governmental function is conferred upon a political
branch. Rather, he found "the issue is whether the Constitution has
given one of the political branches final responsibility for interpret-
ing the scope and nature of such a power.""13
An examination of the Constitution for such explicit and un-
equivocal textual commitments, however, exposes the paucity of
such grants of power.'36 Yet, the majority found such a commit-
ment in the word "sole" in Clause 6, emphasizing that the word is
used only twice in the Constitution, both times with respect to the
impeachment powers. 37 Justice White rejected the significance the
majority placed upon the words having been used only twice,
pointing out that the Framers used the words to ensure the separa-
tion of the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the impeach-
ment process between the two bodies.' Moreover, Justice White
found the majority's "willingness to abandon its obligation to re-
view the constitutionality of legislative acts merely on the strength
of the word 'sole"' to be perplexing. 39
The majority's review of the history of the Impeachment
Clause also is rejected by Justice White."4 He finds the
majority's statements explain why the Senate rather than the judi-
ciary was chosen to try impeachments, but rejects the argument
that the Impeachment Clause history supports the majority's con-
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 742. The House of Representatives is granted the "sole" power to impeach,
and the Senate the "sole" power to try impeachments. See U.S. CoNST. art. L, § 2, c1. 5
and § 3, cl. 6.
138. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 742. The majority, therefore, identified the wrong body - the
judiciary - as being the body meant to be excluded by the word "sole." The Framers
intent was to ensure that the House of Representatives played no role in the impeachment
trial process. Id
139. Id. An analogy was drawn to the phrase in Article I, § I providing that "All leg-
islative powers" are granted to the House and Senate. Justice White illuminates the incon-
sistency of the Court's approach inasmuch as it has never considered undue the interfer-
ence created by its deciding difficult questions of legislative power. Id
140. Id
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clusion that the judiciary was to play no part in the impeachment
process. 4 '
Upon further review of the relevant history of the Impeachment
Clause, Justice White concludes that according to the majority:
"... the Framers' [sic] conferred upon Congress a potential tool
of legislative dominance yet at the same time rendered Congress'
exercise of that power one of the very few areas of legislative
authority immune from any judicial review."" Thus, he states,
the majority's argument, not Nixon's, truly upsets the careful de-
sign the Framers created: for in a genuinely balanced system, im-
peachment trials by the Senate would function as a control mecha-
nism upon the judiciary while judicial review would guarantee that
minimal procedural standards are adhered to by the Senate.43
Next, Justice White reviewed the majority's contention that the
word "try" does not comprise a judicially manageable standard.'"
Also criticized is the majority's attempt to distinguish this case
from Powell v. McCormack45 First, the majority's argument that
it is impossible to ascertain the meaning of "try" as the Framers
intended is rejected.'" Second, Justice White criticizes the
majority's focus upon the manageability of "try" in its legal sense
and its rejection of the standard as presenting "no identifiable
textual limit."'4 7 Clearly if the Court has the ability to interpret
elusive constitutional standards such as "Commerce ... among the
141. Md. at 742-43. Justice White stated that this history clearly establishes that the
Framers thought that officials' public misdeeds should be tried by the representatives of
the people. Id. at 742. Furthermore, the fledgling judiciary was inadequately prepared to
tackle political issues and in any event ought not to try both" impeachment and criminal
trials emanating from the same controversy. Id. It was also clear that the Legislature was
chosen in order to act as an important check on the almost unrestrained judiciary. Id.
142. Id. at 743.
143. Id.
144. IdR at 743-44. The majority's position is summarized as follows: because of the
multiple denotations of the word "try," the Court is unable to conclude that the term was
intended to constitute a limit upon the methods chosen by the Senate to conduct impeach-
ments. Id. at 744. And, says the majority, compared with the three specific requirements
in the Impeachment Trial Clause (the oath requirement, a two-thirds vote, and control
over Presidential impeachments by the Chief Justice), 'Wty" was not meant to operate as a
limitation on the Senate and further indicates the unmanageability of the term. Id.
145. Id. See generally supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Powell.
146. Id. It is noted that the Framers most likely intended the word "try" in its legal
sense, especially in light of the use of the words "tried" and "trial" in the third sentence
of the Impeachment Clause ('when the President of the United States is tried") and in
Article IT, § 2, Clause 3 ("the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment"). Id.
147. Id.
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several States" and "due process of law," argues Justice White,
discerning the significance of the word "try" should present no
greater an obstacle. t48  Moreover, one might expect that if any
concept were to fall within the realm of judicial ability it would be
that dealing with procedural justice.149
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority's declination to review the claims of Walter Nix-
on on the ground that they present a non-justiciable political ques-
tion is the improper approach for the judiciary to take. Rather, the
Supreme Court's proper role, as well as that of the lower federal
courts, is to review the procedures afforded to ensure minimal
constitutional protections, especially in light of the grave conse-
quences to the individual once impeached.' By declaring that
the Senate has unreviewable authority to conduct impeachment
hearings in any manner it deems appropriate, the Court shuns its
duty as enforcer of the Constitution.
Not only does the Court reach the wrong conclusion on the
question of justiciability, but the analysis and rationale upon which
it rests its decision is unconvincing. The Court first concludes that
the word "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient
precision to afford a judicially manageable standard.' However,
as Justice White explained, the courts are fully competent to inter-
pret and apply this standard, particularly when considered in light
148. Id. at 745. Moreover, Justice White criticizes the majority for its conclusion that
since judicial review could result in an upheaval of the political process, especially were a
President's impeachment trial held unconstitutional, "the Court ought to refrain from up-
holding the Constitution in all impeachment cases." Id. at 745 n.3. The Senate's precipita-
tion of a crisis should not be grounds for the judiciary to abandon its Constitutional
duties. Id. at 745.
149. Id. Justice White's analysis of the Senate's use of a Rule XI committee and its
compatibility with the requirement that the Senate "try" impeachments is omitted, as dis-
cussion of the merits of Nixon's claim is beyond the scope of this comment. Justice
White ultimately concludes that the use of the evidence gathering committee is compatible
with the constitutional requirement that the Senate "try" impeachment cases. Id. at 747.
The majority's refusal to reach this determination, he states, arises out of a "laudable"
deference to the authority of the legislature that ultimately does "violence" to the Consti-
tution. IaL The deference that should be afforded the legislature instead can be found in
the Constitution, which affords the Senate ample discretion in conducting impeachments.
IL
150. Indeed, the majority recognized the consequences of impeachment as "doom[ing] to
honor or infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the com-
munity." l at 738.
151. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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of other constitutional doctrines of even less clarity that have been
interpreted. For example, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments has been interpreted numerous times. 15
2
Also, the Equal Protection Clause, another amorphous requirement,
has been given substantive meaning by the Courts."' Inasmuch as
courts "try" criminal and civil cases regularly in fulfillment of their
essential purpose, it would seem appropriate to infer that the Fram-
ers intended the Senate's proceedings to resemble these judicial
trials. 4
The Court not only concluded that "try" was a judicially un-
manageable standard, but also determined that the Framers' assign-
ment of exclusive power to the Senate to try impeachments meant
that the judiciary could play no part whatsoever in the im-
peachment process." The majority's analysis of the significance
of this "sole" power to try impeachments, however, is misleading.
The Senate is vested with the exclusive power to hear the facts
and decide the fate of an individual impeached by the House of
Representatives. 56 That the judiciary should have absolutely no
role in the determination on the merits of whether a judgment of
acquittal or conviction is appropriate is clear. This substantive de-
termination was specifically taken out of the realm of judicial
review because of its import as a limitation on the unrestrained
judiciary.157
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that "sole" indicates that
the judiciary cannot review the procedural aspects of the Senate's
conduct either. 8 By blurring the distinction between the substan-
tive determination and the procedural mechanisms used to reach
152. See generally TRIBE, supra note 61, at 629-32, 663-768 (procedural due process);
553-86, 1302435 (substantive due process).
153. See generally id. at 1436-672.
154. Judge Edwards, dissenting from the D.C. Circuit Court's majority opinion, argued
that:
[b]y using a word used elsewhere in the Constitution to refer to judicial pro-
ceedings, the framers appeared to reveal an intention that Senate impeachment
"trials" would bear some rough likeness to the sort of "trials" carried out in
criminal courtrooms.
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aft'd, 113 S. CL 732
(1993).
155. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text. The judiciary was considered to be
unrestrained because of its independence and unaccountability to the public. See Nixon,
113 S. Ct. at 743 (White, J., concurring).
158. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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that determination, the Court effectively gives the Senate free reign
with respect to this most powerful tool. But, the Court does not
stop there. It continues, attempting to bolster its argument that
"history and contemporary understanding of the impeachment pro-
visions" support its reading of the language by pointing out that
neither Nixon nor the Government offered evidence of any refer-
ence in the Constitutional Conventions or in modem commentary
alluding to the possibility of judicial review in this context.5 9
This argument too must be seen as the facade it really is. As
established 190 years ago in Marbury v. Madison,6) the federal
courts have the power to review the constitutionality of legislative
acts and conduct even though judicial review is not mentioned
anywhere in the constitution. Justice Marshall therein stated that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."' 6 The Supreme Court was thus
deemed the final arbiter of the Constitution. Obviously, Nixon's
inability to produce evidence from the annals of the Constitutional
Convention referencing judicial review does not therefore compel
the conclusion that the judiciary cannot review any component of
the impeachment process.
Moreover, the Court's argument that the mention of judicial
review of ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and statutes at
the Constitutional Convention does not necessarily exclude from
judicial review the Impeachment Trial Clause. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the majority's argument would mean that any constitu-
tional provision other than the three specifically mentioned would
be exempt from judicial review. The Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence, interpreting significantly more than just these three provi-
sions, belies this notion.
Furthermore, another of the majority's arguments can be turned
on its head. Specifically, the majority argued that the Senate was
chosen for the tribunal to try impeachments because Framers be-
lieved the Supreme Court was too few in number to be entrusted
with such broad discretion." This fact, stated the majority, sup-
ported its conclusion that the Court should have no role in the
impeachment process. When considered in practical terms, a group
159. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737.
160. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
161. Id. at 177.
162. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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of seven or nine individuals was deemed too small a number to
handle impeachments. Yet the Senate committee established con-
sisted of a small group of Senators, whose function was to do all
factfinding and report to the full Senate." Inasmuch as the full
Senate did not receive further evidence and also because it is
doubtful that many Senators viewed the hearings held by the com-
mittee, it is quite possible that the Framers' intent has been frus-
trated by the use of a small number of persons to effectively "try"
Nixon's case.
The majority makes the additional argument that judicial review
in the instant situation would eviscerate an important constitutional
check placed on the judiciary by the Framers."e This argument is
disingenuous in light of the review actually being sought by Nixon.
It is not the review of the substantive determination of guilt or
innocence and appropriateness of impeachment, but review of the
procedures implemented to reach that decision that is sought to
ensure that a "trial" has occurred.
This point is even more evident when considered in conjunc-
tion with the majority's claim that sufficient checks on the Legisla-
ture already exist, so there is no need for judicial review. The
majority points to the division of powers between the House and
Senate with respect to impeachments as well as the supermajority
vote requirement as constituting such sufficient checks." When
viewed in another light, however, it appears that these checks may
indeed be insufficient. The fact of the matter is that the Senate did
not hear the evidence first hand, but rather read the report depict-
ing the observations and perceptions of a small group of individu-
als. Where the vote is based on such second-hand evidence, even a
two-thirds majority vote requirement may be insufficient to counter
any prejudicial effect emanating from the opinions of such a small
committee.
Moreover, in cases where credibility and veracity of witnesses
is a key issue, as was the case in Nixon's trial, 67 the appropri-
164. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
167. As noted by the district court, one of the key witnesses at the trial testifying
against Nixon recanted earlier testimony in the federal criminal trial, but later recanted the
recantation before the Senate Committee. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 11
(D.D.C. 1990), aJJ'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), affid, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). Fur-
thermore, another key witness repudiated a prior sworn affidavit and deposition testimony
before the Senate Committee. Id.
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ateness of second-hand evidence gathering would seem greatly
diminished. In fact, this was one of Nixon's contentions in his
quest for judicial review. Nixon submitted tabulations showing that
in the full Senate's vote to convict him, a substantially greater
percentage of Senate committee members voted to acquit him than
did non-committee members who had not heard the evidence nor
viewed any witnesses.'68 Had the Senators heard the evidence di-
rectly, it is possible that because less than two-thirds of the com-
mittee members had voted to impeach Nixon on one of the counts,
the full Senate might also have voted to acquit had it viewed the
evidence.69
Besides its textual commitment argument, the Court states that
lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief further coun-
sel against a finding of justiciability. 7 ' The Court employs the
oft cited slippery slope argument that opening the door to judicial
review in this instance would expose the political life of the coun-
try to months or perhaps years of chaos. 7' This argument, too,
lacks the persuasiveness the Court would attribute it. Judicial re-
view of Nixon's claim, resulting in a holding of unconstitutional
procedures being employed, would require that a new "trial" be
granted. The Senate would undoubtedly rectify the constitutional
pitfalls of its committee system in such a circumstance to ensure
that all future impeachment proceedings satisfied constitutional
procedural requirements.
The majority also espoused its fear that a Presidential impeach-
ment may be overturned in such a situation, thereby jeopardizing
the legitimacy of any successor, hampering his effectiveness."
This fear seems unfounded when the likely practical significance of
a finding of unconstitutionality of the "trial" afforded is considered.
As stated above, the Senate is most likely to modify its procedures
to cure the constitutional defects. One would certainly expect such
a modification were a Presidential impeachment being considered
- the Senate would not be willing to take the chance that its
impeachment decision would be overturned based on the inadequa-
cy of its procedures. Thus, the majority's argument, while appear-
168. Id at 11.
169. Id The district court noted that "[tihis showing lends support to [Nixon's] claim of
unfairness." Id
170. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
171. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993).
172. Id
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ing sound in theory, crumbles under practical consideration.
The argument in favor of justiciability and review on the mer-
its is also bolstered by the recent decision of the District Court for
the District of Columbia in Hastings v. United States. '73 Hastings
was another federal district court judge who was impeached and
had a trial by a Senate committee consisting of twelve senators.
Hastings was convicted by the Senate and subsequently removed
from office. 74 He challenged the Senate's proceedings as uncon-
stitutional and the district court held that the trial was in fact un-
constitutional and deprived him of his due process rights.75
The Hastings court distinguished Nixon on its facts, emphasiz-
ing Hastings' acquittal on the criminal charges from which the
Articles of Impeachment stemmed. Nixon was convicted on the
criminal charges brought against him. Thus the court stated that it
was imperative that Hastings receive a trial before the full Senate
because, unlike Nixon, there was no transcript of a criminal con-
viction that could be made a part of the record of impeach-
ment. 76 Rather, it was necessary that the Senate hear all of the
evidence itself to make its own independent determination. Never-
theless, despite this factual difference, several of the court's argu-
ments regarding justiciability and the importance of a full Senate
trial are applicable to Nixon's case and support the conclusion that
in fact a review of the merits of his claim should have occurred.
First, the Hastings court pointed out that impeachments are not
political issues - it is a judicial proceeding undertaken by the
Senate that is necessary to maintain the independence of the judi-
ciary."7 The court argued that to deem impeachments a political
matter unreviewable by the judiciary could result in the political
party that controls Congress impeaching federal judges in order to
give that party a judicial seat to fill.'78 This result would obvious-
ly be in contradiction of the purposes of the Framers in construct-
ing the impeachment process.
Second, the court rejected the argument that since "impeach-
ment trials are wholly the province of the legislative branch ...
that the judicial branch can never reach any issue that involves im-
173. 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated by 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
174. Id. at 492-93.
175. Id. at 501, 504-05.
176. Id. at 494.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 495 n.5.
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peachment. Independence is not isolation." '79 To the contrary, the
court concluded that to allow the Senate free reign of impeach-
ments without any check on any abuse of that power would de-
stroy the judiciary's independence. 8 ' In such a situation, the judi-
ciary could no longer fulfill its role as the countermajoritarian
force in our system of government.'
Finally, the court reviewed the constitutionality of the proce-
dures afforded Judge Hastings and concluded that they were consti-
tutionally insufficient. Specifically, the court found the Senators to
have acted in a reviewing capacity rather than a fact-finding capac-
ity.'82 Basic notions of fairness mandate that those who are to
make the final judgment must be present to find all of the
facts.'83 Recognizing the burden that trial by the full Senate im-
poses upon the Senators' conduct of their business, the court con-
cluded nonetheless that such procedures are necessary and that in
any event the burden will be imposed infrequently." It found
paramount the respect due the judiciary as a coordinate branch of
government."
In light of these strong arguments, it is clear that the Supreme
Court in Nixon v. United States should have found the issue of the
Senate's use of a committee to try Nixon's impeachment to be
justiciable. Whether or not Nixon received all the procedural
protections to which he is constitutionally entitled, the Court failed
to fulfill its own constitutional role by refusing to assess the merits
of Nixon's allegations. While it is unlikely that the Senate will
disregard its constitutional duty and engage in procedures that do
not have any semblance of a trial, by refusing to subject this area
to judicial review, the Senate is afforded unreviewable and un-
checked discretion to exercise its impeachment powers. In the
foreseeable event of an impeachment in which the Senate goes too
far in constraining the procedures afforded the impeached individu-
al, the question remains how the Court would respond. Surely it
would be undesirable for the Court in the future to change its
179. Id. at 496.
180. Id. at 497.
181. Id. at 498.
182. Id. at 502.
183. Id. The court acknowledged that the Senate did take its role seriously and had the
intention of fulfilling its constitutional duty, but stated that "[u]nfortunately, the Senate
cared too much about expediency. Justice cannot always be constrained by time." Id
184. Id. at 503.
185. Id.
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position on this issue due only to the egregiousness of the Senate's
procedures.
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